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1 Introduction 
 
Legislative authority in South Africa is divided among the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government. Section 43 of the Constitution provides in this respect 
that the legislative authority of the national sphere of government is vested in 
Parliament;1 that the legislative authority of the provincial sphere of government is 
vested in the provincial legislatures;2 and that the legislative authority of the local 
sphere of government is vested in the municipal councils.3 
 
The division of legislative authority among the different spheres of government 
imposes important limits on each legislature's power to pass legislation. These 
"federalism limits" provide that a legislature (for example, Parliament or a specific 
provincial legislature or municipal council) may not pass legislation that falls outside 
its competence. An important consequence of these limits is that, if a legislature 
does adopt legislation that falls outside its competence, the legislation in question 
will be invalid.4 
 
The allocation of legislative authority to municipal councils gives rise to a number of 
complex questions. One of these is the extent to which municipal councils are 
                                        
*  Warren Freedman. B Com (Wits), LLB (Wits), LLM (Natal). Associate Professor, School of Law, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. Email: freedman@ukzn.ac.za. A shorter 
version of this paper was presented at the Environmental Law Association 2013 Annual 
Conference at the Salt Rock Hotel in Salt Rock on 27 July 2013. 
1  S 43(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
2  S 43(b) of the Constitution. 
3  S 43(c) of the Constitution. 
4  See Freedman "Constitutional Law" para 104. 
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entitled to pass legislation that deals with the conservation and protection of the 
"environment". This issue was considered by the KwaZulu-Natal High Court: 
Pietermaritzburg in Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality.5 
 
In this case the High Court found that even though the functional area of 
"environment" has been explicitly allocated to the national and provincial spheres of 
government and not to the local sphere by the Constitution, municipal councils are 
entitled to pass legislation that deals with the conservation and protection of the 
"environment", at least in those circumstances where it forms a part of "municipal 
planning".6 
 
Before turning to discuss this case, however, it will be useful first to examine the 
manner in which the Constitution allocates legislative authority to the municipal 
councils. 
 
2 The local sphere of government 
 
The legislative powers of the municipal councils are set out in section 156 of the 
Constitution. 
 
Section 156(1) provides in this respect that a municipality has executive authority in 
respect of, and has the right to administer: 
 
(a)  the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of 
Schedule 5; and 
(b)  any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation. 
 
In addition, section 156(2) of the Constitution also provides that a municipality may 
make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the matters which is 
has the right to administer. 
                                        
5  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6. 
6  Schedule 4A of the Constitution. 
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Apart from sections 156(1) and (2), section 156(5) also provides that a municipality 
has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or 
incidental to, the effective performance of its functions. 
 
A careful examination of these sections shows that they distinguish between three 
types of powers: 
 
(a)  First, those powers that are derived directly from the Constitution. These 
powers may be referred to as "original powers".7 
(b)  Second, those that are assigned to municipalities in terms of national or 
provincial legislation. These powers may be referred to as "assigned 
powers".8 
(c)  Third, those powers that are reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the 
effective performance of a municipality's functions. These powers may be 
referred to as "incidental powers".9 
 
3 Original municipal powers 
 
3.1 The nature of a municipal council's original powers 
 
As we have seen, sections 156(1) and 156(2) of the Constitution provide that a 
municipal council has the authority to pass laws in respect of the local government 
matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and in Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
Given that these powers can be altered or withdrawn only if the Constitution itself is 
amended, they form the most significant source of municipal powers and are a 
fundamental feature of local government's institutional integrity.10 
                                        
7  Ss 156(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
8  Ss 156(1)(b) and (2) of the Constitution. 
9  S 156(5) of the Constitution. 
10  The fact that original legislative powers have been conferred on municipal councils by the 
Constitution was confirmed by Moseneke J (as he then was) in his judgment in City of Cape 
Town v Robertson 2005 2 SA 323 (CC) where he held that "[a] municipality under the 
Constitution is not a mere creature of statute otherwise moribund save if imbued with power by 
provincial or national legislation. A municipality enjoys 'original' and constitutionally entrenched 
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Although the Constitution confers the authority on municipalities to pass laws in 
respect of the matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5, the 
same authority has also been conferred upon the national and provincial 
governments. Municipalities, therefore, share the power to pass legislation on the 
matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B with the national and provincial governments. 
 
While municipalities share the power to pass legislation on the matters listed in 
Schedules 4B and 5B with the national and provincial governments, it is important to 
note that they do not share the power to administer and implement these laws. This 
is because the power conferred upon the national and provincial governments to 
pass laws on Schedule 4B and 5B matters is limited by sections 155(6)(a) and 
155(7) of the Constitution. 
 
Section 155(6)(a) of the Constitution provides in this respect that 
 
…[e]ach provincial government ... by legislative and other measures, must provide 
for the monitoring and support of local government in the province… 
 
and section 155(7) that 
 
…[t]he national government, subject to section 44, and the provincial governments 
have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance by 
municipalities of their functions in respect of matters listed in Schedule 4 and 5, by 
regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority referred to in 
section 156(1). 
 
In Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal,11 the 
Constitutional Court held that an important consequence of section 155(7) of the 
Constitution is that neither the national nor the provincial spheres of government 
                                                                                                                          
powers, functions, rights and duties that may be qualified or constrained by law and only to the 
extent that the Constitution permits" (para 60). For a detailed discussion of a municipality's 
original powers, see Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-5, 5-11 to 5-12. 
11  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC). 
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can, by legislation, give themselves the power to exercise executive municipal 
powers or the right to administer municipal affairs.12 
 
This is because, the Constitutional Court held further, the mandate of these two 
spheres is ordinarily limited to "regulating" the exercise of executive municipal 
powers, and the administration of municipal affairs by municipalities and the 
authority to "regulate" does not include the power to exercise municipal 
competencies and perform municipal functions. Instead, it simply includes the power 
to establish a framework within which a municipality must perform.13 
 
In other words, while the national and provincial spheres of government are entitled 
to pass laws regulating the local government matters set out in Schedule 4B and 
Schedule 5B, they are not entitled to legislate on the "core" of Schedule 4B and 
Schedule 5B matters. Instead, they are entitled to pass only framework legislation 
dealing with national standards, minimum requirements, monitoring procedures and 
so on. 
 
In addition, while the national and provincial spheres of government are entitled to 
pass laws regulating the local government matters set out in Schedule 4B and 
Schedule 5B, they are not entitled to give themselves the power to administer or 
implement those laws. The power to administer or implement those laws must be 
exercised by municipalities themselves. 
 
3.2 The scope and ambit of a municipal council's original powers 
 
The scope and ambit of the functional areas set out in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 
have been considered by the Constitutional Court on a number of occasions.14 One 
                                        
12  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 59. 
13  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 59. 
14  See Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC); 
Warey Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 337 (CC); Johannesburg Metropolitan 
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of the most important of these judgments is Ex parte President of the RSA: In re 
Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill.15 
 
In this case the Constitutional Court held that that the scope and ambit of the 
matters set out in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 of the Constitution must be interpreted 
in the light of the model of government adopted by the Constitution and the manner 
in which the Constitution allocates power to the different spheres of government. 
 
In relation to the model of government adopted by the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court has also held that the Constitution: 
 
(a)  distributes authority amongst the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government; 
(b)  provides that each sphere has the autonomy to exercise its powers and 
perform its functions within the parameters of its defined space; 
(c)  imposes a duty on each sphere not to assume any power or function except 
those conferred on it in terms of the Constitution; and 
(d)  confers extensive powers on parliament including the power to pass 
legislation on "any matter", excluding only those matters that fall within the 
functional areas of exclusive provincial competence set out in Schedule 5.16 
 
Two important consequences flow from this model: 
 
First, although they may appear to overlap, the functional areas of concurrent 
national and provincial competence listed in Schedule 4 must be interpreted as being 
distinct from and excluding the functional areas of exclusive provincial competence 
                                                                                                                          
Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC); Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 (CC); Minister for Mineral Resources v Swartland Municipality 2012 7 
BCLR 712 (CC); and Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning v Lagoon Bay Lifestyle (Pty) Ltd 2013 ZACC 39. 
15  Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC). 
16  See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the RSA 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 364; Ex parte President of the RSA: In re 
Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 42; and Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) para 43. 
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set out in Schedule 5.17 This is because even though section 44(2) confers the power 
on Parliament to intervene and pass legislation on a matter set out in Schedule 5, 
the requirements of section 44(2) are very strict and Parliament will be able to do so 
on very rare occasions only. If the functional areas listed in Schedule 4 and 5 
overlapped, therefore, Parliament would be able to pass legislation that affected a 
Schedule 5 matter without first having to satisfy the requirements of section 44(2).18 
 
Second, the functional areas of exclusive provincial competence listed in Schedule 5 
relate only to those matters which may appropriately be regulated within the 
boundaries of a province (intra-provincially) and not to those matters which should 
be regulated across the boundaries of a province (inter-provincially).19 This is 
because the grounds on which parliament is entitled to intervene in Schedule 5 
matters in terms of section 44(2) of the Constitution and the grounds on which 
national legislation may override provincial legislation in terms of section 146(2) of 
the Constitution clearly show that Parliament has the authority to regulate those 
activities that take place across provincial boundaries. If the functional areas listed in 
Schedule 5 include activities that take place across provincial boundaries. Therefore, 
Parliament would not be able to regulate them unless it intervened in terms of 
section 44(2) which, as we have seen, is difficult for Parliament to do.20 
 
The principle that a province's exclusive powers relate only to those matters which 
may appropriately be regulated within the boundaries of a province was extended to 
municipalities by the Western Cape High Court: Cape Town in The Habitat Council v 
Provincial Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning Western Cape.21 
                                        
17  Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
51. 
18  Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) paras 
49-50. 
19  Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
53. 
20  Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
52. 
21  Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local Government etc, Western Cape 2013 6 SA 113 
(WCC). 
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In this case the High Court held that a municipality's exclusive powers should be 
interpreted as applying primarily to matters which may appropriately be regulated 
intra-municipally, as opposed to intra-provincially. This means that where a matter 
requires regulation inter-municipally, rather than intra-municipally, the national and 
provincial governments have been given the power to do so, either concurrently or 
exclusively. 
 
In arriving at this conclusion, the High Court relied heavily on the judgment in the 
Liquor Bill case even though that case dealt with the distribution of legislative 
powers between the national and provincial spheres of government, rather than the 
distribution of executive powers between the provincial and local spheres of 
government. 
 
The second principle to which I wish to draw attention concerns the municipality's 
exclusive powers, which should be interpreted as applying primarily to matters which 
may appropriately be regulated intra-municipally, as opposed to intra-provincially. 
 
In Ex Parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 
732 (CC), Cameron, AJ (as he then was) said the following in this connection: 
 
The Constitution-makers' allocation of powers to the national and provincial spheres 
appears to have proceeded from a functional vision of what was appropriate to 
each sphere and, accordingly, the competences itemised in Schedules 4 and 5 are 
referred to as being in respect of 'functional areas'. The ambit of the provinces' 
exclusive powers must, in my view, be determined in the light of that vision. It is 
significant that s 104(1)(b) confers power on each province to pass legislation 'for 
its province' within a 'functional area'. It is thus clear from the outset that the 
Schedule 5 competences must be interpreted as conferring power on each province 
to legislate in the exclusive domain only 'for its province'. From the powers of s 
44(2) it is evident that the national government is entrusted with overriding powers 
where necessary to maintain national security, economic unity and essential 
national standards; to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of 
services; and to prevent unreasonable action by provinces which is prejudicial to 
W FREEDMAN   PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
575 
the interests of another province or the country as a whole. From s 146 it is evident 
that national legislation within the concurrent terrain of Schedule 4 that applies 
uniformly to the country takes precedence over the provincial powers and 
circumstances contemplated in s 44(2)...22 
 
From this dictum it is evident that, where a matter requires regulation inter-
provincially as opposed to intra-provincially, the Constitution ensures that national 
government is accorded the necessary power, either exclusively or concurrently 
under Schedule 4 or through the powers of intervention accorded to it by section 
44(2). It appears that this principle must likewise apply to the proposition that has 
been outlined with regard to intra-municipal, as opposed to inter-municipal 
regulation.23 
 
Apart from the principles set out in the Liquor Bill case, the Constitutional Court has 
also held that where two or more matters in the same Schedule appear to overlap 
with each other they should be interpreted in a "bottom-up" manner.24 A bottom-up 
method of interpretation is one in which the more specific matter is defined first and 
all residual areas are left for the much broader matter.25 
 
When it comes to determining where apparently overlapping functional areas of 
respective spheres commence and end, therefore, a court must determine, first, 
what powers are vested in municipalities; second, what powers are vested in 
provincial governments; and third, what powers are vested in the national 
government.26 
 
                                        
22  Ex Parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
51. 
23  Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local Government etc, Western Cape 2013 6 SA 113 
(WCC) 120C-G. 
24  See Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 
(CC) paras 60-63. 
25  See Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-21 to 5-22. 
26  See Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local Government etc, Western Cape 2013 6 SA 113 
(WCC) 120H-I. 
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In the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, for example, one of the key questions 
the Constitutional Court had to answer was whether the power to approve 
applications for the rezoning of land and establishment of townships fell into the 
broad matter of "urban and rural development", which is listed in Schedule 4A, or 
into the specific matter of "municipal planning", which is listed in Schedule 4B. In 
accordance with the bottom-up method of interpretation, the Constitutional Court 
began its analysis, not with an examination of the scope and ambit of the broad 
matter of "urban and rural development", but rather with an examination of the 
scope and ambit of the specific matter of "municipal planning". 
 
Insofar as the scope and ambit of "municipal planning" was concerned, the 
Constitutional Court began by explaining that although the term is not defined in the 
Constitution it has a particular and well-known meaning, which includes the zoning 
of land and the establishment of townships.27 
 
In addition, the Constitutional Court explained further that there is nothing in the 
Constitution which indicated that the term "municipal planning" should be given a 
meaning which is different from its common meaning.28 The power to approve 
applications for the rezoning of land and the establishment of a township did, 
therefore, fall into the area of "municipal planning" listed in Schedule 4B.29 
 
After coming to this conclusion, the Constitutional Court turned to consider whether 
the same powers also fell into the broad matter of "urban and rural development". 
The Court held that they did not. In arriving at this conclusion, the Constitutional 
Court began by explaining that the term "urban and rural development" could not be 
interpreted in a way that included the power to approve applications for the rezoning 
of land and the establishment of townships. This is because, the Constitutional Court 
                                        
27  Johanesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 57. 
28  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 57. 
29  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 57. 
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explained further, such an interpretation would infringe the principles of co-operative 
governance which provide that each sphere of government must respect the 
functions of the other spheres and must not assume any functions or powers not 
conferred upon them by the Constitution or encroach on the functional integrity of 
the other spheres.30 
  
An important consequence of this approach, the Court went on to hold, was that the 
term "urban and rural development" should be interpreted narrowly so that each 
sphere of government could exercise its powers without interference by another 
sphere of government.31 
 
Having found that the term "urban and rural development" was not broad enough to 
include the powers that form a part of "municipal planning", the Constitutional Court 
then concluded, it was not necessary to go any further and define exactly what the 
scope of the functional area of "urban and rural development" was.32 
 
                                        
30  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
paras 58, 61. 
31  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 62. 
32  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 63. In Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 2 SA 
554 (SCA) para 35 the Supreme Court of Appeal described the "bottom-up" approach as follows: 
"The construction that was adopted by the court below ... and that was advanced before us by 
counsel for the respondents, all proceed by inferential reasoning from the proposition that the 
functions with which we are now concerned are embraced by the concept of 'development' (a 
functional area that falls within the concurrent legislative authority of national and provincial 
government) and thus, by inference, fall to be excluded from the functional area 'municipal 
planning'. That line of reasoning seems to me to approach the matter the wrong way around. It 
is to be expected that the powers that are vested in government at national level will be 
described in the broadest of terms, that the powers that are vested in provincial government will 
be expressed in narrower terms, and that the powers that are vested in municipalities will be 
expressed in the narrowest terms of all. To reason inferentially with the broader expression as a 
starting point is bound to denude the narrower expression of any meaning and by so doing to 
invert the clear constitutional intention of devolving powers on local government". 
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In the same case, the Constitutional Court also held that not only must the 
functional areas listed in Schedule 4 be interpreted as being distinct from the 
functional areas listed in Schedule 5, but the functional areas within each Schedule 
must also be interpreted as being distinct from one another. "Urban and rural 
development", therefore, must be given a different content from "municipal 
planning". In this respect, the Constitutional Court stated that: 
 
It is, however, true that the functional areas allocated to the various spheres of 
government are not contained in hermetically sealed compartments. But that 
notwithstanding, they remain distinct from one another. This is the position, even in 
respect of functional areas that share the same wording, like roads, planning, sport 
and others. The distinctiveness lies in the level at which a particular power is 
exercised. For example, the provinces exercise powers relating to 'provincial roads', 
whereas municipalities have authority over 'municipal roads'. The prefix attached to 
each functional area identifies the sphere to which it belongs and distinguishes it 
from the functional areas allocated to the other spheres. In the example just given, 
the functional area of 'provincial roads' does not include 'municipal roads'. In the 
same vein, 'provincial planning' and 'regional planning and development' do not 
include 'municipal planning'. The constitutional scheme propels one ineluctably to 
the conclusion that, barring functional areas of concurrent competence, each 
sphere of government is allocated separate and distinct powers which it alone is 
entitled to exercise.33 
 
4 Assigned municipal powers 
 
Sections 156(1) and (2) of the Constitution provide that municipal councils have the 
authority to pass laws with respect to the matters assigned to them by national or 
provincial legislation.34 These sections must be read together with section 
44(1)(a)(iii) of the Constitution, which provides that the National Assembly may 
assign any of its legislative powers, except the power to amend the Constitution, to 
                                        
33  Johanesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 55. 
34  For a detailed discussion of a municipality's assigned powers, see Steytler and De Visser Local 
Government Law 5-42 to 5-50. 
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any legislative body in another sphere of government. In addition, they must also be 
read together with section 104(1)(c) of the Constitution, which provides that a 
provincial legislature may assign any of its legislative powers to a municipal council 
in that province. 
 
The National Assembly's authority to assign any of its legislative powers to the 
provincial sphere of government was considered by the Constitutional Court in its 
judgment in Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial 
Government.35 One of the issues the Constitutional Court had to decide in this case 
was whether the National Assembly could assign a matter that falls outside of 
Schedules 4 and 5 to the provinces impliedly rather than expressly. The 
Constitutional Court held that it could not; instead, it had to assign these matters 
expressly. 
 
The Constitutional Court based its decision on the following grounds: 
 
First, that section 104(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution states that a provincial legislature 
has the authority to pass legislation on any matter outside Schedule 4 and 5 that has 
been "expressly" assigned to it by national legislation.36 
 
Second, that the word "expressly" should not be interpreted broadly to include the 
word "impliedly". This is because the constitutional scheme shows that the legislative 
authority of the provinces must be clearly identifiable and that the word "expressly" 
must be given a meaning that is consistent with this scheme.37 
 
Third, that the principle of the rule of law provides that when Parliament assigns 
powers to the provinces it must do so in a manner that creates certainty about the 
                                        
35  Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 
(CC). 
36  Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 34. 
37  Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 35. 
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nature and extent of the powers assigned. This means that the assignment of 
legislative powers must leave no doubt about the act of assignment and the nature 
and scope of the powers assigned.38 
 
Fourth, that this approach is consistent with Chapter Three of the Constitution, 
which provides that 
 
...all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must not 
assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the 
Constitution. 
 
The public should be left with no doubt about which sphere of government has 
legislative competence with regard to the matter concerned. This is to preclude 
disputes.39 
 
Apart from the grounds set out above, the Constitutional Court also pointed out that 
the use of the qualifier "expressly" in section 104(1)(b)(iii) stands in stark contrast to 
the absence of such a qualifier in section 156(1), where the Constitution refers to 
matters over which municipalities have executive and administrative and, therefore, 
legislative authority. 
 
The Constitution makes a deliberate choice in the formulation of section 
104(1)(b)(iii). Instead of merely requiring that powers be 'assigned', it qualifies the 
assignment by specifying that it must be 'expressly' made. The deliberate use of the 
qualifier 'expressly' in section 104(1)(b)(iii), stands in stark contrast to the absence 
of such qualifier, in section 156(1), where the Constitution refers to matters over 
which municipalities have executive and administrative authority. Section 156(1)(a) 
provides that municipalities have executive authority in respect of, and the right to 
administer, 'the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of 
                                        
38  Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 36. 
39  Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 37. 
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Schedule 5'. Section 156(1)(b) further confers an executive authority on 
municipalities to administer 'any other matter assigned to [them] by national or 
provincial legislation'.40 
 
The implication is that while the power to pass legislation on a matter that falls 
outside Schedules 4 and 5 cannot be assigned by implication to the provincial 
legislatures, it can be assigned by implication to the municipal councils. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that when a matter has been assigned to a 
municipality by national or provincial legislation, the matter will usually become an 
exclusive municipal competence, at least until the national or provincial legislation is 
repealed. This is because, unlike the concept of a delegation, the concept of an 
"assignment" encompasses the full transfer of the authority to exercise power over 
the matter in question. In Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President 
of the RSA,41 for example, Kriegler J stated that it is important to distinguish 
between the concept of an assignment and the concept of a delegation. A 
delegation, he stated further, postulates a less complete transfer of authority than 
an assignment does.42 
 
5 Incidental municipal powers 
 
Section 156(5) of the Constitution provides that a municipality has the right to 
exercise any power concerning a matter that is reasonably necessary for, or 
incidental to, the effective performance of its functions. This power is sometimes 
referred to as the "incidental power". "Incidental power" refers to those matters 
which, strictly speaking, fall outside the functional areas over which a municipality 
has authority, but are so closely connected to the "effective performance of its 
functions" that they are considered to be a part of the functional areas over which a 
                                        
40  Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 40. 
41  Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the RSA 1995 4 SA 887 (CC). 
42  Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the RSA 1995 4 SA 887 (CC) para 
173. 
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municipality has authority. As Steytler and De Visser point out, what this means is 
that while section 156(5) does not confer new functional areas on a municipality, it 
does confer on a municipality the power to adopt measures that will enhance the 
effective administration of its existing functional areas. This could, for example, 
include the power to create offences and impose penalties for transgressing a by-
law, or, perhaps, the power to impose an environmental authorisation procedure.43 
 
The incidental power was applied in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg.44 The facts of 
this case were as follows: prior to 2004 the residents of Phiri in Soweto were 
charged a flat rate of R68,40 per month for using water supplied to them by the 
City. This amount was based on a deemed monthly consumption of 20 kilolitres of 
water per household. The actual monthly consumption per household, however, was 
much higher, although it was not possible to tell how much of the excess was 
consumed by residents or lost through leakage. Despite the fact that they were 
charged only R68,40 per month, most of the residents of Phiri did not actually pay 
this amount. 
 
In order to reduce the amount of water lost through leakage and to increase the 
rate of payment, the City decided to abandon the system of deemed consumption 
flat rate charges and replace it with a free basic supply of six kilolitres per household 
per month and a pre-paid meter system. The applicants, who were residents of Phiri, 
then applied for an order declaring the City's decision to be unconstitutional and 
invalid. They based their application on a number of grounds. One of these was that 
the decision to install pre-paid meters was not authorised by the law. 
 
In response the City argued that the installation of the pre-paid meters was 
authorised by section 3 of the City's Water Services By-laws, which provided for 
three different levels of water service, namely Service Level 1, Service Level 2 and 
                                        
43  For a more detailed discussion of a municipality's incidental powers see Steytler and De Visser 
Local Government Law 5-6 to 5-8. 
44  Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC). See also Western Cape Provincial 
Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government 2001 1 SA 500 
(CC). 
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Service Level 3, which was the level of service provided to the residents of Phiri. 
Insofar as this level was concerned, section 3(2)(c) of the By-law expressly stated 
that it had to consist of: (a) a metered full pressure water connection to each stand; 
and (b) a conventional water borne drainage installation connected to the Council's 
sewer. 
 
Although section 3(2)(c) of the By-law did not expressly refer to pre-paid meters, 
the City argued further, the phrase "a metered full pressure water connection" had 
to be interpreted to include both credit meters and prepaid meters, and that the 
installation of pre-paid meters was therefore authorised by the By-law. The 
Constitutional Court accepted the City's argument. In addition, it also held that 
section 95(i) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act ("Municipal Systems 
Act"),45 which expressly requires local government to provide accessible pay points 
for settling accounts or for making pre-payments for services,46 conferred the 
authority on the City to install pre-paid meters. 
 
Apart from these two arguments, however, the Constitutional Court also held that 
the power to install pre-paid meters was reasonably incidental to the effective 
performance of the functions of a municipality. This was because, the Court held 
further, the power to install pre-paid meters was one which was reasonably 
incidental to providing services to citizens in a sustainable manner that permitted 
cost recovery. Given that the power to install pre-paid meters was reasonably 
incidental to the effect performance of its functions, the Court held further, section 
3(2)(c) of the By-laws should be interpreted in a manner that conferred this power 
on the City.47 
 
Although the issue in this case was not whether the municipal council had the power 
to pass a law dealing with pre-paid meters, but rather whether the municipal council 
had in fact passed such a law, the judgment can be interpreted as saying that while 
                                        
45  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
46  S 95(i) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
47  Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 111. 
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the subject-matter of pre-paid water meters does not fall into any of the functional 
areas set out in Part B of Schedule 4 and 5, and especially not into the functional 
area of "water and sanitation services" listed in Part B of Schedule 4, a municipal 
council can still pass a law on pre-paid water meters because they are so closely 
connected to "water and sanitation services" that they are considered to be a part of 
that functional area. 
 
6 Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 
 
6.1 The facts 
 
The facts of this case were as follows. In 2010, the eThekwini Municipal Council 
adopted a resolution amending its town planning scheme to introduce the Durban 
Open Space System ("D-MOSS"). This system is aimed at protecting areas that have 
a high biodiversity value in Durban by creating a system of open spaces that are 
interconnected. In order to achieve this goal, the system provides that land which 
falls within a D-MOSS area may not be developed without first obtaining an 
environmental authorization in terms of the municipality's town planning schemes, 
and even then it may be developed only subject to strict controls aimed at protecting 
the ecological goods and services the land provides. 
 
After the municipal council adopted this resolution, the applicant, who owned land 
located in the eThekwini Municipality and whose land fell into a D-MOSS area, 
applied for an order declaring the resolution to be unconstitutional and invalid. He 
based his application, inter alia, on the grounds that the subject matter of the 
resolution was the "protection of the environment"; that the "environment" is listed 
in Schedule 4A of the Constitution as a functional area of national and provincial 
legislative competence; and, consequently, that the resolution fell outside the 
legislative authority of the municipal council and was therefore unconstitutional and 
invalid. 
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6.2 The judgment 
 
The High Court (per Gyanda J) rejected the applicant's argument. In arriving at this 
decision, the High Court began by observing that the functional area of "municipal 
planning", which is set out in Schedule 4B, must be interpreted in the light of section 
24 of the Constitution, which provides that "[e]veryone has a right to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being", and section 152(1)(d), 
which provides that one of the objectives of local government is to "promote a safe 
and healthy environment". These sections clearly indicate that the functional area of 
"municipal planning" includes responsibility over environmental affairs.48 
 
In addition, the High Court observed, the functional area of the "environment" is not 
contained in a hermetically sealed compartment. Instead, it is an area over which all 
three spheres of government enjoy overlapping authority. This is because 
municipalities are in the best position to know, understand and deal with issues 
involving the environment at a local level, and also because municipalities have 
historically always exercised legislative responsibility over environmental affairs as a 
part of municipal planning. Given that authority over the functional area of the 
"environment" had to reside in all three spheres, it could not be inserted in Part B of 
Schedules 4 and 5. Instead, it had to be inserted in Part A of Schedule 4.49 
 
Apart from finding that "municipal planning" includes responsibility over 
environmental affairs, the High Court also held that it is clear that legislative and 
executive authority over environmental matters as a part of municipal planning has 
been assigned to municipalities by national and provincial legislation. In this respect 
the High Court started by pointing out that section 23(1)(c) of the Municipal Systems 
Act, which deals with integrated development planning at a municipal level, 
recognises that there is an obligation on municipalities together with other organs of 
state to contribute to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained 
                                        
48  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 19. 
49  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 paras 20-21. 
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in section 24 of the Constitution, and that this was clearly a legislative mandate from 
the national legislature with regard to environmental matters.50 
 
In addition, the High Court pointed out further, sections 25 and 26 of the Municipal 
Systems Act provide that not only must every municipality adopt an integrated 
development plan ("IDP"),51 but also that every IDP must include a spatial 
development framework52 and - in terms of the regulations issued under the 
Municipal Systems Act53 - that every spatial development framework must "contain a 
strategic assessment of the environmental impact of the spatial development 
framework".54 
 
Besides the Municipal Systems Act, the High Court went on to point out, section 2 of 
the National Environmental Management Act ("NEMA")55 contains a set of national 
environmental management principles that apply to the actions of all organs of 
state, including municipalities, that may significantly affect the environment,56 and 
section 33 of the same Act allows a person to institute a private prosecution in those 
cases in which the accused has infringed a municipal by-law and the by-law is 
"concerned with the protection of the environment". Section 33 of NEMA thus 
envisages the enactment of municipal by-laws that deal with the protection of the 
environment.57 
 
In addition, section 48 of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act58 
provides, inter alia, that municipalities must not only align their IDPs with the 
national biodiversity framework and any applicable bioregional plan,59 but must also 
incorporate the provisions of the national biodiversity framework or bioregional plan 
                                        
50  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 24. 
51  See s 25(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
52  See s 26(e) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
53  Reg 2(4)(f) of the Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management 
Regulations published in GN R796 in GG 22605 of 24 August 2001. 
54  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 26. 
55  National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
56  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 34. 
57  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 36. 
58  National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
59  S 48(2)(a) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
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that specifically apply to them in their IDPs,60 and demonstrate in the IDP how the 
national biodiversity framework and any applicable bioregional plan may be 
implemented in their areas of jurisdiction.61 
 
After setting out these principles, the High Court turned to apply them to the facts. 
In this respect it found that municipalities are authorised to legislate in respect of 
environmental matters to protect the environment at the local level and, 
consequently, that the resolution amending the town planning scheme to introduce 
the D-MOSS did not fall outside the legislative competence of the eThekwini 
Municipality: 
 
It is clear from the foregoing and the arguments advanced by the first respondent 
that contrary to the submissions by and on behalf of the applicants, municipalities 
have traditionally been involved in regulating environmental matters at the local 
level and that their functions at this level have been recognised by the drafters of 
the Constitution. Hence, although environmental matters stood as the apparently 
exclusive area for national and provincial governance at those levels, it is clear that 
the authority of the municipalities at local government level to manage the 
environment at that level has always been and is still recognised. It is inconceivable 
that the drafters of the Constitution intended by the manner in which the 
Constitution was framed to exclude municipalities altogether from legislating in 
respect of environmental matters at the local level. In any event, it is clear that 
national and provincial legislation in respect of environmental issues recognises the 
part to be played by municipalities at the local government level in managing and 
controlling the environment.62 
 
Accordingly, I am satisfied that Municipalities are in fact authorised to legislate in 
respect of environmental matters to protect the environment at the local level and 
that the D-MOSS Amendments in no way transgress or intrude upon the exclusive 
                                        
60  S 48(2)(b) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
61  S 48(2)(c) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
62  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 39. 
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purview of the national and provincial governance in respect of environmental 
legislation. I am, therefore, satisfied that the D-MOSS Amendments introduced by 
the first respondent are not unconstitutional and invalid on the basis contended for 
by the applicants, namely, that the first respondent did not have the authority to 
legislate in this regard.63 
 
7 Critical comment 
 
Out of the three categories of legislative powers that municipal councils may enjoy, 
the High Court based its decision on the first two, namely the original legislative 
powers and the assigned legislative powers. For this reason, it is not necessary to 
say anything more about the third category of legislative power.64 
 
Insofar as the first and second categories are concerned, the High Court relied 
primarily on the first category when it held that the functional area of "municipal 
planning" encompasses "environmental matters", and only as an alternative on the 
second ground, when it held that legislative and executive authority over 
environmental matters as a part of municipal planning has been assigned by national 
and provincial legislation to municipalities. 
 
Given that the Constitution allows Parliament to assign matters to the municipal 
councils much more easily than it allows Parliament to assign matters to the 
provincial legislatures, the judgment appears to be correct in holding that national 
and provincial legislation has implicitly assigned legislative authority over 
environment matters as a part of municipal planning to municipalities. 
 
                                        
63  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 40. 
64  Given that the purpose of the incidental power is not to confer new functional areas on 
municipalities, but rather to confer the power on them to adopt measures that will enhance the 
effective administration of the functional areas over which they already have authority, it might 
be possible to argue that those parts of the D-MOSS that make provision for environmental 
authorisations do fall into the incidental powers of the eThekwini Municipality. It is not clear, 
however, that those parts of the D-MOSS that deal with the protection of biodiversity do. This is 
because they appear to deal with matters that fall into the functional area of the "environment". 
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When it comes to the first category, however, it is not clear whether the functional 
area of "municipal planning" can simply be interpreted to encompass "environmental 
matters at the local level" or at least not "environmental matters at the local level" in 
the broad sense the use of this phrase by the High Court suggests. In this respect 
the following points can be made: 
 
First, that including "environmental matters at the local level" in the functional area 
of "municipal planning" potentially upsets the division of subject-matters envisaged 
by the drafters of the Constitution. An examination of Schedules 4 and 5 indicates 
that while the drafters allocated certain environmental matters to the local sphere of 
government, such as air pollution, domestic waste water disposal, noise pollution 
and refuse removal, they reserved all other environmental matters, for example the 
protection of biodiversity, for the national and provincial spheres.65 Given these 
points, it may be argued that the protection of biodiversity falls outside the original 
legislative competence of the local sphere of government. 
 
Second, that including "environmental matters at the local level" in the functional 
area of "municipal planning" means that there will be an overlap between the 
functional area of "municipal planning" in Part B of Schedule 4 and the functional 
area of "environment" in Part A of Schedule B. In the Gauteng Development Tribunal 
case, however, the Constitutional Court held that even though they are not 
contained in hermetically sealed containers, the functional areas are distinct from 
one another and one functional area should not include another. 
 
Insofar as this point is concerned, it should also be noted that while there may be an 
overlap between the functional area of "environment" and the functional area of 
"municipal planning", this does not give a municipal council the power to legislate in 
                                        
65  The environmental matters explicitly allocated to the local sphere of government in Schedules 4B 
and 5B of the Constitution include the following: air pollution; storm water management systems 
in built-up areas; water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and 
domestic waste water and sewage disposal systems; beaches and amusement facilities; 
cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of 
animals; noise pollution; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal 
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the overlap. In other words, this does not give a municipal council the power to pass 
legislation that deals predominantly with the "environment" rather than with 
"municipal planning". In the case at hand it is difficult to know whether the 
Resolution introducing the D-MOSS system deals predominantly with the 
"environment" or with "municipal planning". As pointed out above, this is because 
the High Court did not clearly identify the subject-matter of the Resolution. 
 
Third, that including "environmental matters at the local level" in the functional area 
of "municipal planning" could have unintended practical consequences. This is 
because in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case the Constitutional Court also 
held that while the national and provincial governments have the power to pass 
legislation with respect to the matters listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 5, they do 
not have the power to implement that legislation. The power to implement national 
and provincial legislation dealing with the matters listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 
5 vests exclusively in local government. 
 
While the functional area of "municipal planning" cannot simply encompass the 
broad subject-matter of "environment matters at the local level" for the reasons set 
out above, this does not mean that the functional area of "municipal planning" does 
not include certain specific environmental matters at the local level. Unfortunately, it 
is difficult to know which sorts of specific environmental matters at the local level 
should be included in the functional area of "municipal planning". This is because the 
High Court found that the substance of the resolution amending the town planning 
scheme to introduce the D-MOSS was simply the "environment", without first 
examining the resolution in the light of the factors that have been identified by the 
Constitutional Court on several occasions.66  
 
                                        
66  See Ex parte Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature: In re KwaZulu Amakhosi and 
Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Bill of 1995 1996 4 SA 653 (CC) para 19; Western Cape Provincial 
Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government 2001 1 SA 500 
(CC) para 36; Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 
732 (CC) paras 63-64, 68; and Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the Province of 
KwaZulu-Natal 2010 2 SA 99 (CC) para 21. 
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In the DVB Behuising case, for example, the Constitutional Court held that when it 
comes to determining whether or not legislation falls into a particular legislature's 
field of competence, a court first has to determine "the subject-matter or the 
substance of the legislation, its essence, or true purpose and effect, that is what the 
[legislation] is about". In other words, the court has to look beyond the legislation's 
character or form and identify its true purpose and effect.67 
 
The reason a court must look beyond the legislation's character or form and identify 
its true purpose and effect, the Constitutional Court held further, is because the 
purpose and effect may show that although the legislation purports to deal with a 
matter that falls within a legislature's field of competence, its true purpose and 
effect may be to achieve a different goal, one which falls outside the legislatures 
field of competence.68 
 
In addition, the Constitutional Court also held that, when a court seeks to determine 
the subject-matter or substance of the legislation in question, it should take the 
preamble to the legislation and its legislative history into account. This is because 
they serve to illuminate the legislation's substance. "They place [the legislation] in 
context, provide an explanation for its provisions and articulate the policy behind 
them."69 
 
In the same judgment, the Constitutional Court went on to warn that it may not be 
possible to subject a particular piece of legislation to a uniform analysis directed at 
yielding a single characterisation of what its purpose might be. A single statute 
might have more than one purpose. Different parts of that statute may thus require 
different assessments in regard to the disputed question of legislative competence.70 
                                        
67  Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial 
Government 2001 1 SA 500 (CC) para 36. 
68  Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial 
Government 2001 1 SA 500 (CC) para 37-38.  
69  Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial 
Government 2001 1 SA 500 (CC) para 36. 
70  Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial 
Government 2001 1 SA 500 (CC) para 39. 
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If the High Court had followed the procedure set out above more closely, we would 
undoubtedly have a much better sense of whether or not the specific environmental 
matters dealt with by the D-MOSS Amendments fell into the functional area of 
"municipal planning" and, consequently, of the sorts of specific environmental 
matters at the local level that may or may not be included in "municipal planning". 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
While the judgment in Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality has correctly confirmed 
that municipal councils have the original authority to pass legislation dealing with 
environmental matters as a part of their power to pass legislation dealing with 
municipal planning, it has not set out the scope and ambit of this power as clearly as 
it could have. Given, however, that similar schemes will in all likelihood be 
implemented in other municipalities in the future, it seems inevitable that the issues 
raised in Le Sueur will be the subject of further litigation. This will contribute to the 
development of our nascent jurisprudence in this complex area of the law. 
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